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Abstract—This paper addresses the problem of protecting dis-
tributed IoT units from network based attacks while still having a
high level of availability. In particular we suggest a novel method
where the IoT device execution state is modeled with a suitable
high level application model and where the execution state of the
application of the IoT device is “mirrored” in a cloud executed
machine. This machine has very high availability and high attack
resistance. The IoT device will only communicate with the mirror
machine in the cloud using a dedicated synchronization protocol.
All essential IoT state information and state manipulations are
communicated through this synchronization protocol while all
end application communication directed towards the IoT units
is done towards the mirror machine in the cloud. This gives
a very robust and secure system with high availability at the
price of slower responses. However, for many non-real time IoT
application with high security demands this performance penalty
can be justified.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the near future, a very large number of IoT devices will
perform critical security tasks in systems for industry process
control, building automation, power control, healthcare etc.
The correct operation of each of these units is crucial for the
robustness of the system. Failure of a single critical component
can give very severe consequences. Many IoT devices are
resource constraint with respect to power, CPU capacity, mem-
ory etc. Hence, they are hard to protect from network based
attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, distributed
DoS (DDoS) [1]. The main defense strategy against this type
of attacks is restricting the communication interface towards
the IoT devices which makes it both harder to perform attacks
against the IoT device as well as limiting the consequences of
successful attacks. However, this obviously has the drawback
that the IoT devices might be harder to reach or the power
consumption on the IoT devices goes up as the defense strategy
requires more CPU cycles. Hence, there is a large need for
solutions that find the right balance between availability and
security of IoT devices. This paper addresses exactly this area
by suggesting a novel principle for IoT protection with fairly
high availability.
As shown in Figure 1 IoT architectures can be classified
into two categories: centralized IoT and decentralized IoT.
Unlike centralized IoT where all the IoT devices are passive
as their only task is to provide data, distributed IoT allows
connected entities to retrieve, process, combine and provide
data and services to other entities [4]. Our work addresses
the vulnerabilities of the distributed IoT against DDoS or
Fig. 1. Centralized IoT (left) vs Decentralized IoT (right)
denial of sleep attacks [7], [5], [6] which could be mounted
due to direct connection between the IoT devices and the
client. Obviously, a centralized IoT offers better protection to
the IoT devices against DDoS since they do not have direct
connection with the clients. In order to protect the IoT devices
against these attacks, we propose a solution combining the
decentralized and centralized IoT architectures by building an
“IoT virtualization” cloud infrastructure at a centralized IoT
network, where each IoT device is mirrored in the cloud in
the form of a virtual machine and the end-user application
interact with this virtual machine in exactly the same manner
as if it is interacted with the real IoT device directly. The
actual IoT device then uses a special purpose synchronization
protocol with the virtual machine mirror in the cloud and in
this manner indirectly interacts with the end-user applications.
The advantage with this approach is that it is much harder for
an adversary to attack the IoT device as much better protection
can be provided on the “mirror machine” than on the real
machine. Hence, a good level of DoS protection is given
without the need to modify at all the end IoT application and
its interactions patterns.
A. Existing Solutions
The work in [5] presented a survey about denial of sleep
attacks and defenses in wireless sensor networks. Many of
the threats discussed in [5] can be defeated using encryp-
tion and authentication algorithms along with other jamming
identification techniques and trigger techniques to preserve
energy on affected devices. MAC-based solutions have been
previously proposed in [8], [9], [10]. However, the work in [6]
showed that if attackers are aware of the MAC protocol used9781-5090-1445-3/16$31.00 c© 2016 IEEE (CloudSPD’16)
Fig. 2. Typical set-up in current systems.
in the wireless sensor networks then they can mount denial-of-
sleep attacks. The authors of [6] also proposed a framework
for mitigating these denial-of-sleep attacks using a strong
link-layer authentication along with other techniques. More
recently, the work in [2] presented another MAC solution for
protecting IoT devices against DoS based on a short MAC
that can be used by an IoT device to distinguish authorized
packets from non-authorized packets.
Other DDoS mitigation techniques typically “hide” the IoT
devices between local networks and GateWays (GWs) in the
networks where strict filtering rules are applied to protect
sensitive IoT devices from attacks as depicted in Figure 2.
It is then the responsibility of the GW or firewalls in the
network to filter out hostile traffic and/or act as proxies in
the network that distinguishes “open domain” (i.e. internet)
protocols from “private domain” (i.e. local network) protocols
where the IoT devices are situated. The main drawback with
filtering based solutions is that it is very hard to code them
such that they provide a high security level and at the same
time they avoid filtering out valid traffic. With respect to
proxy based system, they are often rather costly to deploy
as they must be customized typically for each and every
IoT application. Furthermore, the proxy security filtering rules
must be very strict in order for them to avoid passing through
potential hostile traffic targeting the IoT devices behind the
proxy.
Our solution enjoys the robust security properties of cen-
tralized IoT architectures against DoS attacks provided by the
cloud and the direct interaction facility between clients and
IoT devices existing in distributed IoT architectures.
Fig. 3. Main principle of the solution.
B. Problem Statement
We consider the problem of protecting sensitive and re-
source constraint distributed IoT devices from hostile traffic
like DoS/DDoS and network based attacks on open networks
while still being available for legitimate traffic in the network.
In particular, we consider the problem of combining a high
level of protection with high availability. This means that while
we would like to hide resource constraint IoT devices from
being directly exposed to Internet traffic, we still want them
be accessible by legitimate users.
II. SUMMARY OF THE NEW SOLUTION
A. Process
We suggest a novel principle for protection of IoT units
against network based attacks. All IoT devices are utilizing
a unique device virtual machine mirror in a virtual infras-
tructure back-end system. The mirror is not a pure virtual
machine copy of the IoT execution, but a high level machine
that regularly synchronizes the essential IoT state with the
corresponding state in the real IoT device. Furthermore, the
mirror machine receives all direct requests targeting the real
IoT device from the application domain, i.e. all traffic directed
towards the real IoT device. This implies that the external
world that wants to interact with the IoT devices in the system,
always needs to communicate with their corresponding mirror
machines only. No direct communication with the IoT devices
themselves is allowed. The IoT devices on the other hand only
run a dedicated synchronization protocol with their “own”
virtual mirror and will not accept any other network based
communication at all. The overall principle is depicted in
Figure 3. In summary, the proposed system solution has the
following main characteristics:
• During IoT device deployment, the IoT device is
launched together with a dedicated “IoT mirror machine”
in a cloud infrastructure. The IoT devices and these mirror
machines are configured with security credentials such
that they can interact securely over open networks.
• The IoT device runs a special synchronization protocol
that keeps it synchronized with its corresponding mirror
machine in the cloud. This synchronization protocol
keeps the state information of the most important data
objects on the IoT device synchronized with the corre-
sponding data on the mirror machine. Synchronization
is always initiated by the IoT device which will only
accept synchronization sessions initiated by itself. All
other network information is blocked at the IoT device
which can also choose to turn off all network interfaces
when there is no ongoing synchronization.
• An end-application such as an end-user client or a back-
end application system that wants to exchange data or
interact with an IoT device, does not have direct network
access to the IoT device, but will always interact with the
mirror machine in the cloud. Hence, from the end IoT
application point of view, the IoT infrastructure consists
of the mirror machines only and it is not aware of the
physical machines at all or their network addresses.
• When a request reaches the IoT mirror machine which
requires direct execution on data sets belonging to the
“real” IoT device, the mirror machine will be able to
execute those instructions on the mirror machine data
(local copy of the data objects from the IoT device)
and respond to the request. Any manipulation that might
happen on the data due to such request will be synchro-
nized with the IoT device during the next synchronization
operation. This implies that there is a “delay” that will
depend on the frequency of synchronizations between
outside request and their execution on the real IoT device.
The exact delay time will depend on how frequent the
synchronizations take place.
• An end-application might request an operation that cannot
be performed on stored data objects values only. In
this case the IoT mirror machine creates one or several
“execution requests” similar to the principle described
in [3]. These execution commands are then transferred
from the mirror machine at the next synchronization
operation and the potential responses are transferred back
to the mirror machine.
B. Advantages
The present paper gives very high protection of sensitive
IoT devices such as resource constraint and battery driven
devices. This is accomplished by the fact that a device will
never accept any network session which it has not initiated
itself and as it will only interact directly with its corresponding
mirror machine in the virtual back-end 1. Instead, it receives
all its data and operation requests through synchronization
operations with the mirror machine. Hence, all attacks tar-
geting sensitive IoT devices must be launched either against
the synchronization interaction protocol or against the mirror
machine instead of the real IoT device. As the mirror machine
1Obviously the IoT unit might need general IP configurations which might
include network traffic. If this is the case, this type of traffic will obviously
be allowed at the IoT device (at least for a limited amount of time).
is not operating on a resource constraint platform, it can run
with very high protection against DoS and other network based
attacks. This makes it a much less attractive attack target than
the real IoT device. Furthermore, by creating a high level data
and execution model of the IoT device in the mirror machine,
it will never be possible for an adversary to make any low
level attack attempts toward the real IoT device since such
manipulations or execution events cannot take place.
The main drawback with our solution is obviously that real-
time communication with the IoT devices is not possible. This
might not be acceptable for some IoT applications, on the
other hand, there are a large set of applications where the
delay in the interactions with the IoT devices does not cause
any major problems. Such applications include sensors that
regularly reports data for central processing such as tempera-
ture, humidity, wind power, IR detection, etc. Other application
examples are devices that are centrally managed with respect
to configuration, firmware update, etc, but are used for local
control, i.e. to control a process over a local wired ore wireless
interface. For those applications, the suggested approach gives
a very robust and secure system solution.
Another advantage with our proposed solution is that the
IoT device does not necessarily need to provide an end appli-
cation remote interface. It is actually enough that the mirror
machine provides such interface. Since the mirror machine
runs on a powerful device, it will be able to satisfy integration
requirements with a very large number of different application
systems. Hence, apart from giving a much more secure system,
the solution also gives a bi-effect simpler application system
integration.
III. DETAILED DESIGN
Next, we give a detailed description of our solution. We
discuss three different aspects that constitute the core of our
solution:
• The design and principle for the mirror machines in the
virtualized infrastructure.
• IoT device and mirror machines deployments.
• IoT device to mirror machine synchronization.
A. Mirror machine design
The basic principle of our solution is based on a design
with a “mirror machine” that operates at a virtual back-end
infrastructure (a cloud). The design is assuming that the IoT
system developer is able to construct a data object model of
the most important data sets that the IoT device handles. It also
needs to define a distinct set of operations that the IoT devices
perform on these data objects. All these operations must then
be implemented and supported on the IoT mirror machine as
well. Furthermore, the IoT system developer needs to define
(if needed) a set of operations performed by the IoT devices
which do not simply depend on those defined data objects sets
but also on other state or external input devices available at
the local IoT network.
These set of operations constitute the “supported command
set”. This command set is used to transfer command requests
Fig. 4. Mirror machine model.
pending in the mirror machine (which cannot execute them)
to the IoT device.
A synchronization execution unit with some regularity both
on the IoT device and the mirror machine are the modules in
the system responsible for synchronizing the data objects at
the IoT devices and the mirror machine respectively.
How often synchronization takes place is system specific
and will depend on the real-time requirements of the IoT ap-
plication. Some of the data objects are typically only changed
due to state changes in the IoT devices while some other data
objects are changed due to incoming requests to the mirror
machine from the IoT end-application system.
Some IoT requests from the end application system toward
the mirror machine cannot be executed by the mirror machine
itself. These are then placed in a “command queue” at the
mirror machine. All pending commands are transferred from
the mirror machine to the IoT device when the next synchro-
nization occurs and then executed on the IoT device. The result
of the execution is reported back in the form of updated data
objects. An overview of the system and the mirror machine
model is shown in Figure 4.
B. IoT device and mirror machines deployments
The solution consists of the following main deployment
steps:
• Develop the data object model, IoT device model and
define shared commands and realize a mirror machine
(binary) that follows this model 2.
• Launch the mirror machine on suitable available com-
puting resources. This can be done in the form of a Java
virtual machine, a system virtual machine or an appli-
cation running in a cloud environment. Some different
options are outlined in Figure 5.
• Configure the Mirror machine and the IoT device with
shared credentials that allow them to set up secure
connections during their synchronization process. Also
the IoT device must be equipped with the network address
of the mirror machine. The shared credentials can be in
2This step can be considerably simplified if a pre-defined model is used.
the form of shared secret keys or shared trusted public
keys and corresponding certificates 3.
• Install and start the IoT device.
• Once installed, the IoT device connects to its mirror
machine and makes sure it can establish a secure au-
thenticated connection with its mirror machine. If this
succeeds, the IoT device is ready for use.
The overall deployment procedure is depicted in Figure 6.
C. IoT device to mirror machine synchronization and ma-
chines operations
In the descriptions, we use the following notations:
• We denote an arbitrary IoT device in the local network
by u.
• We denote the mirror machine corresponding to u by mu.
• We denote the command queue at mu by qm.
• We denote a data object set used by the mirror machine
and the IoT by D.
• We denote the data objects at mu in D which are changed
since the last synchronization attempt by dm.
• We denote the data objects at u in D which are changed
since the last synchronization attempt by du.
• We denote the parameter at u determining the time
between two consecutive synchronization attempts by t.
The synchronization procedure is completely determined by
the configurations at the device u. The IoT device decides
when to connect to the mirror machine and perform the
next synchronization operations. During the synchronization
session, all the data objects (part of the IoT mirror machine
model) changes on the mirror machine since the last synchro-
nization session, dm, are updated on the IoT device to match
the changes. Similarly, all the data objects on the IoT device
changes since the last synchronization session, du, are updated
on the mirror machine to make sure the two data object sets
on both the IoT device and its mirror machine are identical
at the end of the synchronization session. Furthermore, the
mirror machine, mu, maintains a command queue, qm, which
is a command buffer containing all pending commands that
must be executed on the real IoT device and which are the
results of requests targeting the IoT devices received by the
mirror machine since the last synchronization session. The
synchronization session takes place in the following order over
a secure channel (authenticated, integrity and confidentiality
protected such as for instance a TLS or DTLS channel)
between u and mu:
1) u requests all changes in dm, from mu and updates its
own data set.
2) u requests all commands in the current command queue
at mu.
3) u executes all the pending commands locally (this might
result in an update of the data set du).
3This can be done using a manual process as depicted in Figure 6 or
preferably through automatic processes during the deployment of the IoT
device and its mirror machine (Step 4 and Step 2 respectively)
Fig. 5. Some different mirror machine deployment options.
Fig. 6. IoT device and mirror machine deployments.
4) u sends all the updates in du to mu which updates its
local data object set such that the two sets now coincides.
5) Depending on the type of commands or the number of
changes identified in the data sets at mu, the device u,
might decide to change the synchronization time, t to
more or less frequent synchronizations.
Below, we describe the details of the operation principles of
the mirror machine and the real IoT device respectively.
Mirror Machine procedure:
1) The mirror machine, mu, is deployed on the system (see
Section III-C ) and the sets dm and qm are both empty.
2) The mirror machine waits for requests from connecting
IoT clients or from synchronization requests from u.
3) If a new IoT client request arrived the following applies:
a) If the request was authorized (allowed according
to the IoT mirror machine security policies), the
request is accepted and executed.
b) All data object changes which are the result of the
request in step 3.a are marked and the set dm is
updated.
c) All requests that results in commands that are
not possible to execute on mu are transformed to
commands and put on the command queue, qm.
d) Jump to Step 2.
4) If a new synchronization request from u arrives, the
following applies:
a) The request is authenticated using the pre-installed
credentials shared with u and if it comes from any
other device but u, it is refused (move back to step
2).
b) mu sends all updates in the set dm to u.
c) mu sends all the pending commands in qm and the
command queue is cleared.
d) mu waits for a data set update commands from
u. If such commands are received, the set D is
updated to match the corresponding set at u.
e) mu waits for an end to the ongoing synchronization
session with u.
f) Execute any of the commands that are pending in
the command queue which are due to the ongoing
connected client requests.
g) Move to Step 2.
IoT unit procedure:
1) The IoT device is deployed on the system (see Section
III-C) and the set du is set to empty.
2) The IoT device starts a timer, tc = 0.
3) If tc ≥ t the following applies:
a) u uses the pre-configured network address of mu
to make an authenticated new secure synchroniza-
tion connection attempt to mu (using a suitable
protocols such as TLS or DTLS for instance).
b) u requests the set dm and all the updates to the
objects in this set from mu and based on this
information it updates its own internal data objects
in the set D.
c) u requests all pending commands in the queue qm
from mu.
d) u executes all pending received commands from
mu. This results in an update of the data in the set
du
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e) u sends the set du and all the changes to this data
set to mu.
f) u closes the synchronization session with mu.
g) u evaluates the changes in D and the received com-
mands from mu in the last synchronization session
and updates t according to the predefined policy
determined by the particular IoT application 5.
h) Move to Step 2.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The synchronization and mirror machine based protection
principle described in this paper gives a very high network
attack protection level for distributed IoT units, which do not
have strict real-time requirements. The most vulnerable IoT
units are battery driven and/or resource constraint units. These
are also units typically not having strict real-time requirements.
This implies that the solution is useful in a very large set of
distributed IoT use-case scenarios where resource constraint
IoT units need to be protected from network based attacks. On
the other hand, more powerful distributed IoT units with real-
time requirements will not benefit from using the suggested
approach, but these also have other rather efficient means for
protection against network based attacks.
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